Case Assignment
Using the base resources provided in the Module, the syllabus and supported by additional individual research for credible government, academic and grey literature sources, address the following questions in a properly formatted APA paper of at least 1,000 words and no more than 2,000 words (generally between 5 to 8 pages in length in APA format – double-spaced in 12pt. Times New Roman font). The word count does not include the cover page, abstract or references. The paper should not be written directly answering the questions below, yet as an integrated academic paper that addresses each dimension.
1. Understanding the characteristics of terrorism. Identify the 3 or 4 characteristics that you think most define terrorism? Use an example from the Mumbai attack to support your choices.
2. What are three unique characteristics (i.e., tactics, operations, or strategy) evident in the Mumbai attacks that make this a different kind of terrorist operation?
3. There are concerns surrounding the possibility of a Mumbai-style attack in the US. Considering the terrorist threat today, do you consider these concerns legitimate? Why or Why not
4. Using the five mission areas of the National Preparedness Goal (2015), assess India’s response to the Mumbai attacks?
Readings
Case Study I: The Continued Relevance of the Mumbai Attacks
We have now reached your first individual assignment for this course. You will be asked to analyze the attack on Mumbai from terrorism/counter-terrorism perspective. As noted earlier, almost an endless number of locales are vulnerable to such an attack and hence all aspects of the attack, response, mitigation, and recovery are being consistently reviewed and used for training purposes. Just to emphasize the importance of this model, the 2015 Paris attacks followed a similar pattern.
1. Rizvi, S. & Kelly, J. (June 2015). The Continued Relevance of the November 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attack: Countering the Next Attack. Homeland Security Affairs 11, Article 6.
Main Argument: This text sought to analyze the use of modern technology in the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks in 2008. The goal of the article was to provide recommendations for homeland security professionals to address similar future attacks based on lessons learned from this particular attack. The text is focused on the technology used not the geo-political climate that fostered the attack. In summary, “To further increase situational awareness during fluid events, emergency responders must now expand their sources of information to include social media and other developing networks..”
Why Included: Technology is a constant, albeit constantly evolving, tool available to those that wish to threaten the safety and security of the United States. However, instead of rejecting technology or being fearful of it, homeland security professionals can counter technology with technology by embracing, understanding, and employing it to counter the enemy. As noted in the title of the article, lessons learned from the Mumbai Terror Attack are still relevant to the homeland security enterprise
Case:
The attack was not the first time Mumbai had been targeted nor was it the last. In 2006, 209 people died when a commuter train was bombed. In July 2011, more than 20 people were killed and over 100 injured when three IEDs exploded. Located on the Arabian Sea, Mumbai is a thriving symbol of modern India. It is the country’s financial and entertainment center that attracts a large number of foreign visitors and has landmark properties such as the Taj Mahal Palace and Trident-Oberoi Hotels. All of these may be reasons why the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)chose Mumbai but it also may have had more global goals. Originally created by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, LeT was a convenient asymmetric means to confront India’s “unlawful occupation” (according to Pakistan) of Kashmir. Certainly the Mumbai attack served traditional terrorist goals of reminding the world of theunresolved dispute over Kashmir, maintaining Pakistani fervor and support for the Kashmir issue, and encouraging recruits to the organization.
However, the November 26, 2008 attack was different. It demonstrated military-like training and operational control. The LeT showed a new level of capability that enhanced its legitimacy as a participant in the global jihad, a commitment it had recently made. And, it illustrated how terrorism is integrating new technologies to enhance command and control, intelligence, and exploitation of events. The location had been reconnoitered, first by an American, David Headley, who conducted surveillance in 2006, 2007, and 2008 and then by others just prior to the attacks. During these periods some weapons were pre-positioned. After entering the city via the dinghy from a hijacked trawler, Kuber, ten men, divided into four teams, attacked the central train station, the Cama & Albless Hospital, the Leopold Cafe, a favorite of westerners, the Chabad Center, and the two hotels. The sequential roving attacks held the city of Mumbai hostage for 62 hours and resulted in 172 dead. The primary weapons were small arms and improvised explosive devices which fit well with the teams’ highly mobile strategy, reminiscent of military squad training. Their mobility was further facilitated by their use of cell phones, a satellite phone, and blackberries allowing the attackers to coordinate maneuvers, talk to the media to make hostage demands, and maintain contact with their external handler, who plays the role of a commander, encourager, and ultimately orders the attackers to commit suicide as security forces close in.
The Indian response has been characterized as a strategic, operational, and tactical failure. Although Indian officials received intelligence regarding a probable attack from both the US and their own sources, the information was deemed not to be sufficiently reliable to share broadly. The ease with which the attackers entered Mumbai from the sea indicates a lack of capability by the coast guard to effectively monitor the coastline. Security forces, who initially confronted the terrorists, were ill equipped, lacked specific training for setting up command posts and containing the event.& However, the method of attack would severely test any cities ability to establish a perimeter. Moreover, the lack of proper equipment and logistical deployment also slowed the response by the National Security Guard (NSG), the country’s prime counter-terrorism force. Stationed near Delhi, the capital, rather than being disbursed in bases around the country, the NSG does not have its own airlift capability. Overall, the Indian first responders lack inter-operability, training, and communications. The government failed to control the media by neither projecting an image of controlling events nor limiting reports from various points around the city that provided the terrorists with real-time intelligence as well as adding to the chaos by inflating the size of the attacking force.
The following movie “Terror in Mumbai” presents a moment-by-moment account of the horrific attacks that took place in 2008. The film (please note the disclaimer) provides a graphic account of the Mumbai attack and contains scenes that some viewers may find disturbing.
Comparing NYC and Mumbai Attacks–Strangely Similar [Via STRATFOR]
The 2008 Mumbai terror attack was remarkable for its execution and apparently unconventional tactics. But when compared to a plot uncovered 15 years ago that targeted prominent hotels in Manhattan, it becomes apparent that the Mumbai attack was not so original after all.
The 1993 New York Landmarks Plot
In July 1993, U.S. counterterrorism agents arrested eight individuals later convicted of plotting an elaborate, multistage attack on key sites in Manhattan. The militants, who were linked to Osama bin Laden’s then-relatively new group, al Qaeda, planned to storm the island armed with automatic rifles, grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In multiple raids on key targets combined with diversionary attacks, they aimed to kill as many people as possible.
The planned attack, which came to be known as the “Landmarks” plot, called for several tactical teams to raid sites such as the Waldorf-Astoria, St. Regis and U.N. Plaza hotels, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and a midtown Manhattan waterfront heliport servicing business executives and VIPs traveling from lower Manhattan to various New York-area airports. The militants carried out extensive surveillance both inside and outside the target hotels using human probes, hand-drawn maps and video surveillance. Detailed notes were taken on the layout and design of the buildings, with stairwells, ballrooms, security cameras and personnel all reconnoitered. This attack would have followed by a few weeks the failed bombing inside the parking garage of the World Trade Center which killed six and injured 29.
The attackers intended to infiltrate the hotels and disguise themselves as kitchen employees. On the day of the attack, one attack team planned to use stolen delivery vans to get close to the hotels, at which point heavily armed, small-cell commando teams would deploy from the rear of the van. Stationary operatives would use hand grenades to create diversions while attack teams would rake hotel guests with automatic weapons. The attackers planned to carry gas masks and use tear gas in hotel ballrooms to gain an advantage over any security they might come up against. They planned to attack at night, when the level of protection would be lower.
The targeted hotels host some of the most prestigious guests in Manhattan. These could have included diplomats like the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who traditionally keeps an apartment in the Waldorf-Astoria, or even the U.S. secretary of state, who is known to stay at the Waldorf during U.N. sessions. They also host various business leaders. If successful, the attackers doubtless would have killed many high-profile individuals key to New York’s stature as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.
Meanwhile, the plots to detonate explosives in the Lincoln and Holland tunnels would have blocked critical transportation infrastructure, sowing chaos in the city as key escape routes were closed off. And VIPs seeking to escape the city via the midtown heliport would have been thwarted by the attack planned for that location. In fact, the heliport attack was planned to be carried out using watercraft, which also could have been used to target transport ferries, further disrupting transportation in and out of Manhattan. The New York City Police Department could plausibly even have quarantined Manhattan to prevent the attackers from fleeing the city.
With the city shut down and gunmen running amok, the financial center of the United States would have been thrown into chaos and confusion until the attackers were detained or killed. The attacks thus would have undermined the security and effectiveness of New York as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.
At the time, U.S. counterterrorism officials deemed that the attack would have had a 90 percent success rate. Disaster, then, was averted when federal agents captured the plotters planning the Landmarks attack thanks to an informant who had infiltrated the group. Sure enough, the United States dodged a major bullet that could have been devastating to New York.
Read more: From the New York Landmarks Plot to the Mumbai Attack | Stratfor
errorism, Homeland Security, National Security, and International Cooperation
The United States’ National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011) describes the fundamentals of counterterrorism as they relate to homeland security as follows:
“Offensive efforts to protect the Homeland have been complemented by equally robust defensive efforts to prevent terrorists from entering the United States or from operating freely inside U.S. borders. To support the defensive side of this equation, we have made massive investments in our aviation, maritime, and border-security capabilities and information sharing to make the United States a hardened and increasingly difficult target for terrorists to penetrate.
These efforts must continue. We know al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates continue to try to identify operatives overseas and develop new methods of attack that can evade U.S. defensive measures.At the same time, plots directed and planned from overseas are not the only sort of terrorist threat we face. Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa‘ida have engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are likely to try to follow their example, and so we must remain vigilant.
We recognize that the operating environment in the Homeland is quite different from any other country or region. First, the United States exercises sovereign control and can apply the full strength of the U.S. legal system, drawing on the capabilities of U.S. law enforcement and homeland security communities to detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats. Second, in the Homeland, the capabilities and resources of state, local, and tribal entities serve as a powerful force multiplier for the Federal government’s CT [counterterrorism] efforts.
Integrating and harmonizing the efforts of Federal, state, local and tribal entities remains a challenge. As the threat continues to evolve, our efforts to protect against those threats must evolve as well.
The United States will rely extensively on a broad range of tools and capabilities that are essential to our ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat plots to attack the Homeland even though not all of these tools and capabilities have been developed exclusively for CT purposes. Such tools include capabilities related to border protection and security; aviation security and screening; aerospace control; maritime/port security; cargo security; cyber security; nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical materials and the ability to detect their illicit use; biometrics; critical infrastructure protection; force protection; all hazards preparedness; community engagement; and information sharing among law enforcement organizations at all levels.
We are working to bring to bear many of these capabilities to build resilience within our communi¬ties here at home against al-Qa‘ida inspired radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence. Although increasing our engagement and partnership with communities can help protect them from the influence of al- Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents, we must ensure that we remain engaged in the full range of community concerns and interests. Just as the terrorist threat we face in the United States is multifaceted and cannot be boiled down to a single group or community, so must our efforts to counter it not be reduced to a one-size-fits-all approach. Supporting community leaders and influ¬ential local stakeholders as they develop solutions tailored to their own particular circumstances is a critical part of our whole-of-government approach that contributes to our counterterrorism goals. […]
We must be vigilant against all overseas-based threats to the Homeland, just as we must be vigilant against U.S. based terrorist activity—be it focused domestically or on plotting to attack overseas targets.”
Christine Wormuth from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) presented some options to the Senate in February 2009. Wormuth contends homeland security is “inextricably a part of national security…” As a result, she recommends addressing the international and domestic components of national security “holistically” and by doing so, more effectively distributes the scarce resources (particularly military ones according to Wormuth) that are critical to managing national risk.
Wormuth’s first recommendation was implemented in May 2009, when President Obama combined the Homeland Security and National Security Councils’ (HSC & NSC) staff into the National Security Staff (NSS) while allowing the Councils to continue to exist as separate legal entities. A planned result is a reduction in the perceived, or perhaps real, differences between the Councils’ roles in policy formulation. Critical among these has been the HSC’s inability to execute greater interagency cooperation. We will return to this issue in the section on interagency cooperation. Wormuth presents some interesting counter-arguments that deserve some consideration. Notwithstanding, the linkage of homeland and national security automatically internationalizes the former.
The internationalization of homeland security is based on the reality that securing the homeland cannot be done without international cooperation. Terrorism is stateless and transnational but the recovery from catastrophic events such as Hurricane Katrina also benefit from international cooperation. However, this lesson is focused is on terrorism’s impact on homeland security. The 9/11 attacks present one example of the international nature of homeland security. They were conceived by Saudis and Egyptians in Afghanistan and planned in Hamburg and elsewhere in Europe. The hijackers learned to fly and ultimately executed the attacks in the US while the entire process was funded via an international financial system.
Homeland Security vs. Homeland Defense
Homeland Security’s enduring core missions includes, among others, countering terorrism, which remains the fundamental mission. This involves an inter-agency concerted effort led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), together with intelligence and law enforcement with the goal of preventing terrorist attacks inside the United States, to reduce the nation’s net vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize damage to our economy from such attacks, protect our cities and critical infrastructure as well as assist state and local government in recovery from terrorist attacks.
Homeland Defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, intelligence effort and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. The Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense. Importantly, this mission also entails the demanding and complex role of DSCA [Defense Support fo Civil Authorities] which provides skilled DoD resources to state and local officials who are overwhelmed by the crisis and allows law enforcement augmentation in special circumstances.
• You can learn more about Homeland Defense and DSCA in the following lesson reading: Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2013)
Anti-terrorism vs. counter-terrorism:
Counter-terrorism refers to the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, and police departments may adopt in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and suspected. It includes military special operations, counter-insurgency operations, drone strikes, interception of terrorist cells, manipulation of terrorist websites, communications and financial transactions and combines the efforts of FBI, DHS, the Intelligence Community and DHS in protecting domestic vulnerabilities, ramping up security practices and border controls, maritime and port security and interdiction of terrorist activities.
Anti-Terrorism refers to specific programs of United States assistance and training for allies and friendly overseas nations to thwart, reduce or limit terrorism within their national borders, to curtail terrorist planning activities as part of a broader insurgency, assist nations in devising improved security measures to thwart illicit trafficking in weapons and narcotics, aiding nations in upgrading their political, economic, and infrastructural resources and lending aid to improve Foreign internal defense (FID) to suppress specific insurgencies, or reduce the conditions under which insurgency could develop.
Countering Violent Extremism and the Role of the Social Media
The White House Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States of 2011 defines the challenge as follows and includes some reference to new social media. Reading the subsequent extract, plaeas bear in mind that this strategy references the National Security Strategy of 2010, whereas the current National Secrurity Strategy (part of this lesson’s readings) is of 2015:
“Throughout history, violent extremists—individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals—have promoted messages of divisiveness and justified the killing of innocents. The United States Constitution recognizes freedom of expression, even for individuals who espouse unpopular or even hateful views. But when individuals or groups choose to further their grievances or ideologies through violence, by engaging in violence themselves or by recruiting and encouraging others to do so, it becomes the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government and the American people to take a stand. In recent history, our country has faced plots by neo-Nazis and other anti-Semitic hate groups, racial supremacists, and international and domestic terrorist groups; and since the September 11 attacks, we have faced an expanded range of plots and attacks in the United States inspired or directed by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents as well as other violent extremists. Supporters of these groups and their associated ideologies come from different socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnic and religious communities, and areas of the country, making it difficult to predict where violent extremist narratives will resonate. And as history has shown, the prevalence of particular violent extremist ideologies changes over time, and new threats will undoubtedly arise in the future.
[…]
While we can and must prioritize our efforts, our approach should be enduring and flexible enough to address a variety of current and possible future threats. Individuals from a broad array of communities and walks of life in the United States have been radicalized to support or commit acts of ideologically-inspired violence. Any solution that focuses on a single, current form of violent extremism, without regard to other threats, will fail to secure our country and communities. Our threat environment is constantly evolving, which is why we must consistently revisit our priorities and ensure our domestic approach can address multiple types of violent extremism.
[…]
The past several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens or residents inspired by al-Qa’ida’s ideology and involved in terrorism. Some have traveled overseas to train or fight, while others have been involved in supporting, financing, or plotting attacks in the homeland. The number of individuals remains limited, but the fact that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents are openly and specifically inciting Americans to support or commit acts of violence—through videos, magazines, and online forums—poses an ongoing and real threat.
This type of violent extremism is a complicated challenge for the United States, not only because of the threat of attacks, but also because of its potential to divide us. Groups and individuals supporting al-Qa’ida’s vision are attempting to lure Americans to terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate attack planning, but this also has potential to create a backlash against Muslim Americans. Such a backlash would feed al-Qa’ida’s propaganda that our country is anti-Muslim and at war against Islam, handing our enemies a strategic victory by turning our communities against one another; eroding our shared sense of identity as Americans; feeding terrorist recruitment abroad; and threatening our fundamental values of religious freedom and pluralism. Violent extremists prey on the disenchantment and alienation that discrimination creates, and they have a vested interest in anti-Muslim sentiment. It is for this reason that our security—preventing radicalization that leads to violence—is inextricably linked to our values: the protection of civil rights and civil liberties and the promotion of an inclusive society.
[…]
Our central goal in this effort is to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence. The U.S. Government will work tirelessly to counter support for violent extremism and to ensure that, as new violent groups and ideologies emerge, they fail to gain a foothold in our country. Achieving this aim requires that we all work together—government, communities, the private sector, the general public, and others—to develop effective programs and initiatives.
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, The White House, August 2011, pp. 1-3.
As exemplified by the above extract, when it comes to homeland security, new social media are often referred to as providing breeding ground for extremism, violence, or even recruiting tool for terrorist organizations.
The following lesson readings provide an overview of the use of new social media in homeland security, to counter violent extremism, as well as to enhance disaster response in general. This among other things includes discussion of practical strategies such as “countermessaging” or “rumor management” and common methods such as crowdsourcing to support situational awareness:
• Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate 2014, Using Social Media for Enhanced Situational Awareness and Decision Support. Virtual Social Media Working Group and DHS First Responders Group.
• Helmus, Todd C., Erin York, and Peter Chalk 2013, Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism. Research Report, RAND Corporation.
The following optional reading provides you with an in-depth analysis of how the internet may be of use to lone-wolf terrorists, thus add to the risk, while at the same time adding to our preventive capabilities within a whole community approach:
• Coultas, Brian T. 2015, Crowdsourcing Intelligence to Combat Terrorism: Harnessing Bottom-up Collection to Prevent Lone-Wolf Terror Attacks. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.
Chemical Terrorism
Watch the following video recording of a seminar held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. in July 2015 on “Chemical Safety and Security: TSCA Legislation and Terrorist Attacks”:
“Chemical safety and security is one of the fundamental pillars of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but the recent and ongoing use of dual-use chemicals such as chlorine in the Syrian conflict, several recent chemical accidents in the US, and congressional updating of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) have all raised these goals to a much higher level. This seminar will address three related safety and security issues: (1) new TSCA legislation in the House and Senate; (2) the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS); and (3) Global Partnership efforts to improve chemical safety and security of industry and transportation.”
Biological Terrorism
Watch the following presentation on “Bio-Terrorism: A Biological Approach to Understanding a Political Phenomenon” by Dr. Steven A. Peterson, Professor of Politics and Public Administration, and former Director, Penn State Harrisburg School of Public Affairs. The presentation also includes practical analysis of aspects of biological terrorism.
Citations
• Howard, Russell D. and Sawyer, Reid L. 2006 Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, McGraw Hill, New York.
• Mueller, John. 2009 Establishing Principles for Evaluating Measures Designed to Protect the Homeland from Terrorism. Paper presented at International Studies Association (ISA) New York, New York.
• Sedgwick, Mark. 2004 “Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, pp. 795-814.
